

## ANTI-CORRUPTION

Max Weber Programme Multidisciplinary Research Workshop

<b>11 October 2021</b>	13.00 – 14.30
<b>14 October 2021</b>	13.30 – 15.00 and 17.30 – 19.00
<b>28 October 2021</b>	17.00 – 19.00
<b>5 November 2021</b>	11.00 – 12.30 and 14.00 – 15.30
<b>TBC</b>	TBC

**Organisers:** Michele Castiglioni (MWF - SPS) and Aline Bertolin (former MWF – LAW)

### Abstract:

The Anti-Corruption MWP Multidisciplinary Research Workshop aims at discussing cutting edge research on the topics of corruption measurement, prevention, displacement, and reduction. Policy- oriented research is a central focus of the workshop. The workshop format includes one hour long remote seminars. Where the research methodology employed offers itself a training opportunity, one hour long practical sessions are also be organized.

**Location:** Online (Zoom) and Badia Fiesolana

## Program

**11 October 2021** | 13.00 – 14.30

**Sultan Mehmood** (The New Economic School) on “The impact of Presidential appointment of judges: Montesquieu or the Federalists?”

### Abstract:

A central idea in the institutions and development literature is whether the executive is adequately checked by the legislature and judiciary (North, 1990; Acemoglu et al., 2001; La Porta et al., 2004). This paper provides plausibly causal evidence on how increased constraints on the executive, through removal of Presidential discretion in judicial appointments, impacts judicial decision-making. In particular, we find that when the judge selection procedure in Pakistan changed, from the President appointing judges to appointments by judge peers, rulings in favor of the government decreased significantly and the quality of judicial decisions improved. The age structure of judges at the time of the reform and the mandatory retirement age law provide us with an exogenous source of variation in the implementation of the selection reform. We test for and provide evidence against potential threats to identification and alternative explanations for our findings. The analysis of mechanisms reveals that our results are explained by rulings in politically salient cases and by “patronage” judges who hold political office prior to their appointments. According to our estimates, Presidential appointment of judges results in additional land expropriations by the government worth 0.14 percent of GDP every year.

**Online, via Zoom** (the Zoom link will be shared after registration)

To register, click [here](#).

**14 October 2021** | 13.30 – 15.00

**Cesi Cruz** (UCLA) and **Julien Labonne** (Oxford University, Blavatnik School of Government) on “Making Policies Matter: Voter Responses to Campaign Promises”

*Practical: Field experiments in difficult political settings*

Online, via Zoom (the Zoom link will be shared after registration)

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**28 October 2021** | 17.00 – 19.00

**Martin J. Williams** (Oxford University, Blavatnik School of Government Presentation) on “From Paper to Practice: Implementing Civil Service Reform in Africa”

*Practical: Design and institutionalise performance-oriented reforms*

Online, via Zoom (the Zoom link will be shared after registration)

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**5 November 2021** | 11.00 – 12.30 and 14.00 – 15.30

**Isabela Mares** (Yale University) on “Reforms limiting electoral irregularities in first wave democracies”

*Practical: Designing the book ‘Conditionality and Coercion’*

Hybrid, in person (Badia Fiesolana) and online (Zoom)

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**TBC** | TBC

**Raúl Sánchez De La Sierra** (University of Chicago, Harris School of Public Policy) on “Corruption (With a Hierarchy)”

Hybrid, in person (Badia Fiesolana) and online (Zoom)