As the preceding chapters in this volume demonstrate, parental choice in education—parents’ freedom to choose their children’s school—is a major topic in educational policy in many European nations. In Europe as in the United States, parental choice in educational systems often is advocated as a means to introduce competition for pupils between schools and to decrease the level of bureaucracy in and related to schools, thereby improving the quality of teaching and perhaps reducing the cost of education.

One common assumption of advocates of publicly funded parental choice in the United States is that private schools—especially religious schools—are more effective than public schools. It is increasingly argued that religious, especially Catholic, schools not only provide more effective learning environments but also offer a more effective civic education. This chapter tests those assumptions by reviewing the available empirical evidence with respect to the relative effectiveness of religious schools in a number of European societies, including some already discussed, in order to make some systematic comparisons and generalizations. Several additional examples are introduced and key points in some previous chapters are briefly recapitulated in an attempt to determine what can be said—and the limits of what can be said—on the basis of the available evidence.

An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, Seattle, April 11, 2001.
This review of European evidence should be of interest to a non-European audience because continental European educational systems present a better opportunity than the educational systems of the United States and England to test the relative performance of religious and of public schools. Unlike their counterparts in the United States and England, parents in a number of European societies have long had the opportunity to make a real choice between comparable schools—mostly between public and religious schools—without paying very high fees to the latter. These religious schools are most often Catholic or Protestant schools that operate within a national educational system and receive state grants.

The coexistence of public and religious schools within one national educational system is the unintended result of three processes in these European societies: the struggle between the state and the established churches in Europe; the fight between the eighteenth-century ancien régime (most of which had one state church and suppressed religious minorities) and nineteenth-century liberal governments (which claimed to be neutral toward all churches); and the emergence of new socioeconomic classes in the nineteenth century (skilled workers, craftsmen, laborers) that rejected the dominant classes, whether liberal or conservative. In a number of places (Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France, German Länder (states), the Netherlands, Scotland) these processes had more or less comparable results, with the establishment of public and subsidized religious school sectors that offer parents a choice of schools with the same curriculum and usually similar financial costs. However, the size of the public and religious school sectors varies greatly between and within these places for specific historical reasons, and religious schools disappeared in some of them under communist regimes. Understanding the specific historical experiences of different societies is very important to understanding their current educational systems, although I cannot explore those experiences in depth here. But the long and varied experience with publicly funded religious and public schools in Europe explains why the available evidence is of interest to the United States and England, with their distinct educational systems.

Despite the increasing irrelevance of church and religion in the everyday life of most Europeans, religious schools have not dwindled away. Eurydice (an information network on education in Europe maintained by the European Commission) illustrates this fact for the member states of the European Union during the 1990s. On the contrary, the religious school sector in societies with relatively religiously inactive populations is growing or is strongly overrepresented. This is true not only for societies that traditionally have had such schools, but also for those in which religious schools were
abolished under communist regimes (Hungary, the new German Länder). One possible explanation is that the teaching of religious schools is generally more effective than that of public schools because religious schools, although they no longer strive for the religious socialization of students, still try to attain other noncognitive goals—such as tolerance, social cooperation, and discipline—that are valued by irreligious parents. There also are other explanations for the rise of religious schools in the former communist societies: the distrust of the state as provider of collective goods like education; the lower effectiveness of public schools as a consequence of malfunctioning state bureaucracies; and a lower level of community building by parents and teachers around public schools than around religious schools.\(^5\)

This chapter summarizes all the available empirical research, systematically comparing the cognitive and noncognitive outcomes of primary and secondary public and religious schools in several European countries. We do not discuss here comparisons with schools outside the state-funded private sector (for instance, Waldorf schools in Germany; anthroposophic schools in the Netherlands; exclusive private schools in France, Italy, and England\(^6\)), because such comparisons have the same drawbacks as comparisons between public and religious schools in the United States: the high cost of genuinely private schools might lead to the selection of students with a greater likelihood of finishing school successfully; in addition, educational outcomes might not be easily compared insofar as the schools operate outside a system with a national curriculum and final examinations. Research comparing cognitive and noncognitive outcomes of public and religious schools in Hungary, Scotland, Flemish Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and England/Wales was found.\(^7\) More information is provided on the status of public and private schools in Hungary and Scotland given that the others are covered elsewhere in this book. For the others, research evidence presented earlier in this book and some additional studies are summarized.

Hungary

The Catholic Church dominated religious education in Hungary until Protestant schools were introduced in the sixteenth century.\(^8\) Religious secondary schools had an important role under the nineteenth-century Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and they maintained their position until the imposition of a communist government in 1948. Surviving statistics indicate that students at Jewish and Lutheran schools were more extensively educated than students at other religious schools and that their grades were higher. Karády explains these differences with reference to the marginal role of the small
Lutheran church in Hungary as well as to the assimilation efforts of the Jews, which made a good education more important to them. Historically, ethnic, national, and religious differentiation was a crucial aspect of the Hungarian educational system, but religious education was all but abolished in Hungary after 1948. The Catholic Church—70 percent of the Hungarian population is Catholic—was permitted to keep eight secondary schools, and one Calvinist and one Jewish school were permitted. No Lutheran schools were allowed. The annual intake of students was limited to forty, the curriculum and textbooks were controlled, and the schools were required to celebrate state rather than religious holidays.

The collapse of communism has restored the legal basis for the reemergence of religious education in Hungary, although the process has been slow. As early as 1985, a new law declared “free choice of education,” but the number of religious secondary schools did not immediately increase. Religious schools of the old regime generally had been nationalized under communism, and many of their buildings had been used as public schools for five decades. Only in 1991, when a law was passed dealing with former church properties and compensation for past confiscations, did churches begin to reclaim their old schools, including the original buildings. The process has been a slow: the 2001 deadline for completing the process has been extended to 2011.

In Hungary, most religious secondary gymnasiums reappeared after the fall of communism in 1989. (Hungarian gymnasiums are the most prestigious type of secondary school, as in Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands. They are more or less comparable to the old British grammar schools.) Although their number in Hungary is still small, the increase is significant. In fact, the expansion of enrollment in religious gymnasiums was larger than in public gymnasiums. Religious gymnasiums have to teach the same basic curriculum as public gymnasiums, and students from both have to pass a comparable final examination in their final year of school, at age eighteen; they also have to pass the same entrance examination in order to continue their studies at a college or university. In addition to the previously mentioned explanations for the increase in religious schools in the former communist countries, in Hungary the standard of religious education historically was high.

In the school year 1998–99, 8 percent of secondary schools and 20 percent of gymnasiums were religious institutions. Nearly two-thirds of the religious schools were Catholic, about one-fourth were Calvinist, and about one-tenth were Lutheran. Only a few institutions existed for other denominations (for example, Jewish gymnasiums). By number of students, Protes-
tant schools are larger than Catholic schools and Jewish schools are smallest. Because theology faculties and church-run teacher training colleges also have only recently begun to operate, religious schools have to deal with a shortage of teaching staff; therefore the student-teacher ratio in religious gymnasiums is higher than in public ones (the situation is worst in Catholic and Calvinist schools). Not all students in religious schools belong to the church to which their school belongs, but there is an 80 percent correspondence.

The law requires religious schools to provide students with the same scholastic product as public schools. This means that they have to teach the national curriculum, but there is some flexibility, and they are free to add religion courses. To obtain state financial support, each school must function as a “public provider of the national curriculum” in addition to its specific religious curriculum. The local municipalities administer an annual payment of state support, drawn from the state budget, that is based on student enrollment; a student from a state school and a student from a religious school have the same “value.” In addition, religious schools must make a formal declaration that their activities meet state and local requirements, and local municipalities decide whether a school does in fact comply with state regulations.

The state has provided some special support directly to religious schools to assist with their reorganization. In addition, churches support their schools financially from various other sources, with money obtained from the state budget, from abroad from related churches, or from taxpayers in Hungary, who have a right to direct 1 percent of the tax they pay to a specific beneficiary, such as a charity or a religious school.

Dronkers and Robert is the only study that has tested whether the pupils of religious grammar schools in Hungary have higher grades and a better opportunity to enter vocational colleges or universities than comparable pupils of public grammar schools. Their results, based on data from a self-administered survey of fourth-grade secondary school students, show clearly that pupils at religious grammar schools in Hungary do attain higher grades and more success at entering universities and vocational colleges. This is especially true for pupils at Catholic grammar schools, but there are clear indications that Calvinist and Lutheran grammar schools may catch up with Catholic grammar schools in the near future.

The superior results of pupils in religious grammar schools cannot be explained by their more selective social composition. On the contrary, controlling for pupils’ and parents’ characteristics tends to increase the differences in results between pupils from public and religious grammar schools. Dronkers and Robert do not exclude the possibility that the differences are caused by the higher academic ambition of pupils in religious schools,
because they do not have a direct indicator of academic ambition at the end of secondary school. However, because they do control for grades, which are a good indicator of academic ambition, the greater success of Catholic school students with respect to entering higher education is most likely not due to differences in academic ambition between pupils from public and religious grammar schools. The results of their analyses support the claim that religious schools in Hungary are, on average, more effective than public schools.

Scotland

Scotland had, as an independent kingdom until the Union of 1702, a history of institutions that were distinct from those of England and Wales and other parts of the United Kingdom, and one of those distinct institutions is the education system. The secretary of state of Scotland is responsible for Scottish education. The Scottish educational system has a strong reputation for providing effective education based on long-established key values. The fundamental idea is to provide free, compulsory education for all children within a specified age group that is based on a broad curriculum tailored to the age, aptitude, ability, and the individual needs of the child. Parents are legally responsible for ensuring that their children of school age receive an effective education. Therefore parents can provide education by other means: children can be enrolled in an independent school or parents can educate their children at home. Education, not schooling, is compulsory when a child is of school age (currently five to sixteen years of age).

Religion has been a complicating factor in the Scottish educational system. The preindustrial system was run by the established Church of Scotland. From the mid-nineteenth century, there was substantial Catholic Irish immigration into the rapidly industrializing and urbanizing Clydeside in the west of Scotland, but poverty and discrimination combined to block the social mobility of many Irish immigrants. As long as Catholic schools were controlled by the Catholic Church, the provision of education was severely constrained by the financial constraints of the Scottish Catholic Church and the unavailability of state subsidies. By 1918 or thereabouts, virtually all Catholic schools were taken over by the state, including the eleven secondary schools. Catholic schools subsequently retained their religious identity within the state sector, and in the late 1970s, they taught 19 percent of Scottish pupils. Scottish Catholics continue to experience social disadvantages, however, although probably not to the same degree as Catholics in Northern Ireland.
The state system of secondary education at the end of the 1970s incorporated three distinct phases of historical development of the Scottish educational system. There is the first generation, sixty-six schools that constituted the national secondary school system in the nineteenth century, none of which are Catholic. Second are the 126 second-generation schools founded or designated between 1902 and 1918, ten of which are Catholic. Then there is the third generation, 278 state schools, seventy-one of which are Catholic.

There is only one systematic study of the differences in effectiveness between Catholic and public Scottish schools. Using data from the 1981 Scottish School Leavers Survey, McPherson and Willms found that after controlling for the socioeconomic composition of schools, pupils in Catholic schools in Scotland performed better on the final examinations, especially in English and in arithmetic. These higher scores were worth one or two passing grades on final examinations, and they add considerably to the young person’s chances of finding a job after leaving school or of gaining admission to favored postsecondary institutions. The authors note that their findings controvert casual pessimistic public judgments of the performance of Catholic schools, which are sometimes based on Catholic schools’ unadjusted examination results. These results are inaccurate because of the greater representation of Catholic than non-Catholic school pupils in the lower socioeconomic groups.

Belgium

As Jan de Groof describes in chapter 6, the Belgian constitution guarantees the rights and freedoms of ideological and philosophical minorities, and they have been carefully protected since the independence of Belgium in 1830. These rights and freedoms became the battleground of two “School Wars,” in 1870 and 1958, which led to the establishment of a School Pact among all parties. The original compromise implied that the state had the right and even the duty to establish religiously neutral schools at all educational levels. In exchange for acceptance of this principle, the private schools (almost all Catholic) received state financing. These rights and compromises ensure that all parents will at least be able to decide whether they want a Catholic or a secular school, while in the larger cities other options also are available.

Education in Belgium can be organized with tax support by a variety of sponsors (“networks”). Three networks now exist: community schools, which are directly controlled by the central government; official schools, which are directly controlled by provincial or local authorities; and free schools, which are directly controlled by individuals and associations. Community and offi-
cial schools are similar to the public schools elsewhere in continental Europe. The Belgian educational system is further differentiated by language, with completely separate systems for Dutch (Flemish), French, and the small number of German schools. The “free” schools, which are not under the direct control of national, provincial, or local authorities, are nearly all Catholic: in 1984 they accommodated somewhat fewer than half the students in the French- and German-speaking areas, but two-thirds of those in the Dutch-speaking areas.\(^{19}\) Private schools receive the same 100 percent funding on a per-pupil basis as provincial and locally controlled schools, provided that they conform to program requirements and agree to inspection by the Ministry of Education. Inspections focus on subjects taught (number of hours, global curriculum, but not textbooks) and the language used, and they may also concern pedagogical methods or the religious and philosophical basis of instruction.

The effects of Belgian public and Catholic schools on the cognitive and noncognitive achievements of the pupils have only barely been studied. One of the reasons is the politically sensitive character of the School Pact, which discourages scientific research on its effects. Belgian society during the last quarter of the twentieth century was marked by another cleavage that discourages comparative research on school types, namely, the conflict about the federal structure of Belgium between the Dutch-speaking north (Flanders) and the French-speaking south (Walloon).\(^{20}\) Research on parental choice of public and religious schools in Flanders began in the 1970s with the study of Billiet on the motives of parents for choosing schools.\(^{21}\) The reasons parents gave for selecting a public or a Catholic school concerned the educational program of the school and practical matters such as distance from home. Parental social class did not affect whether students attended public or Catholic schools. However, the fact that parents did not explicitly mention religion does not mean, according to Billiet, that the religious identity of the school was unimportant. To the contrary, religious considerations appear to have been extremely important and simply taken for granted in the selection process. The chance that children from Catholic families would choose a Catholic school was 50 percent if their parents were not integrated into a Catholic community but 97 percent if they were. Students ended up in Catholic schools because they and their families lived in a social milieu in which the decision was almost automatic. Freethinking liberals (nonreligious conservatives and liberals, Social Democrats), distinguished by a common aversion to organized religion, displayed an equally distinctive pattern, and their children were very likely to end up in public schools. Thus differences in lifestyle and in religious convictions and behavior distinguished those who
chose Catholic schools from those who chose public secular schools in 1970s Flemish Belgium.

Studies of the cognitive and noncognitive effectiveness of Flemish schools were not undertaken until the 1990s. Brutsaert built on the conclusions of Billiet by studying whether differences in Catholic and public schools, including differences in discipline and academic expectations, affected the well-being of their students. Brutsaert defined well-being in terms of adjustment to school life as reflected in such affective outcomes as self-esteem, sense of mastery, stress, fear of failure, sense of belonging in school, and educational commitment. In 1989–90 he sampled 1,882 sixth-grade pupils in forty comparable elementary schools in Flanders representing a wide range of institutions with regard to size, organizing authority, degree of urbanization of the school location, and gender composition of the teaching staff. Brusaert compared the well-being indicators separately for girls and boys. Catholic school boys scored significantly better on all but one indicator of well-being (commitment to study). Girls in Catholic schools also tended to score better, but the differences were not significant. Interestingly, the better results for boys disappeared after adjusting for parent socioeconomic status and school characteristics like number of pupils and gender of teachers. Therefore any difference in well-being for boys in public and Catholic schools can be attributed to selective enrollment (based on socioeconomic status) and the increasing feminization of the state schools’ teaching staff. In contrast, after controlling for the same factors, it appears that girls do indeed seem to benefit from Catholic schools, demonstrating statistically significant gains in terms of self-esteem and sense of control.

Brutsaert also has studied differences in learning outcomes in public and Catholic elementary schools, using the same Flemish schools that he used in the study of well-being. To measure learning, he used the students’ grade-point average, as reported by the sixth-graders themselves. Children attending public schools were disadvantaged with respect to their socioeconomic and family backgrounds. After controlling for background factors, Brustaert found that children’s grade-point average tended to be higher in Catholic schools than in public schools. Moreover, children from lower socioeconomic backgrounds in particular did better in Catholic schools than comparable children in public schools. This result flies in the face of the Flemish public schools’ explicit commitment to equalizing achievement among students. Brustaert offers some possible explanations for the higher cognitive outcome of Catholic schools: the schools’ more strenuous demands; the “Pygmalion effect,” caused by greater expectations of higher achievement; and more extracurricular activities.
Other Belgium sociologists have recently studied differences between Flemish public and Catholic secondary school pupils with respect to three politically charged attitudes: *ethnocentrism, authoritarianism*, and *sexual and bioethical liberalism*. Ethnocentrism is a blanket term indicating a form of cultural closeness among members of the same ethnic group (“in-group”) and the degree of hostility toward members of “out-groups,” in this case ethnic minorities such as Turks and Moroccans. Authoritarianism refers to Adorno's original indices of antidemocratic tendencies in the authoritarian personality. The measure focuses on the subject's preference for a repressive, violent reaction toward wrongdoers in Belgian society. Sexual and bioethical liberalism gauges attitudes regarding sexuality, sexual orientation, prostitution, abortion, euthanasia, suicide, and killing in self-defense. There at first appear to be differences between the attitudes of pupils in public and Catholic schools. Pupils in official schools (schools directly controlled by provincial or local authorities) score higher on ethnocentrism, on authoritarianism, and on sexual and bioethical liberalism than pupils in the Flemish community schools (directly controlled by the Flemish community government) and in the Catholic schools. However, these generalizations ignore differences in the types of secondary schools across these sectors. Community schools and official schools are more likely to provide technical and vocational education, and students who attend these schools have lower academic abilities. If one controls for that, there is no difference in pupils’ attitudes in public or Catholic schools. Elchardus and Kavadias make clear that Catholic schools in Flanders recruit from the higher social strata. The old single-sex Catholic schools that offer only general education recruit more students from the upper middle and the upper class. Single-sex Catholic schools tend to recruit students on a higher academic track, and that explains the differences in attitudes between pupils of public and religious schools.

Therefore, and perhaps surprisingly given the history of the Belgian educational system, these studies indicate that Flemish Catholic schools have a far smaller impact than one would expect on religious socialization. Pupils from Catholic schools have more or less the same attitudes towards abortion, euthanasia, and homosexuality as their counterparts. The major difference in pupils' attitudes is a consequence of their different secondary education tracks or school types. This suggests that the division of Belgian society in terms of values is no longer fostered along religious lines but according to a combination of achievement and secondary school type. The continued success of Flemish Catholic schools can likewise be explained best not by successful socialization in religious values, but rather by their success in offering the most valued school type in secondary education to more or less religious pupils.
France

Denis Meuret provides a good summary of the violent history of private schooling in France, of the political nature of the conflict between advocates of public and private schools there, and of the compromise reached in which partial funding of private schools is provided in exchange for regulations that severely reduce these schools’ autonomy. The French overview is important to the topic of this book, because the French political debates on the position of private and public education have strongly influenced the debates in other continental European societies. For example, the French constitutional term “freedom of teaching” can also be found in the German and Dutch constitutions, although its interpretation has become very different. The same holds for the current French compromise of partial funding of regulated private schools: plans for similar arrangements are found in Italy and Spain.

Given the importance of the French example, one would expect many empirical analyses of the effectiveness of French public and private schools. However, there is only one comprehensive study of differences in the effectiveness of public and Catholic schools in France. Langouët and Léger found that the dropout rate between the first and third years for students in state secondary schools was significantly higher than that of comparable students in the Catholic sector (34 percent versus 24 percent). Pupils who were children of employees (the term “employee” is commonly used in Europe to indicate a social class that is higher than “skilled worker,” but lower than “management”) or manual laborers benefited more strongly from this positive effect of Catholic schools. The same held for the dropout rate between the first and fifth year of secondary school: it was 61.5 percent in state schools and 51.3 percent in Catholic schools. Children of parents from the middle management and employee strata benefited most from this effect. In the end, the graduation rate was lower in the state schools (21.7 percent) than in the Catholic schools (28 percent). The great beneficiaries of the French Catholic schools are children of employees, because their graduation rate in Catholic schools is practically equal to the rate of children of middle managers in both state and Catholic schools.

Langouët and Léger discuss seven misconceptions about French religious schools. Meuret mentions some of these points, but they are worth summarizing:

—Underestimating the percentage of pupils who have attended religious schools by focusing only on the percentage in a certain year: a large proportion of all French pupils (35 percent of the cohort of 1972–74; 37 percent of the cohort of 1980) attended religious schools on a temporary basis.
—Misunderstanding the real motives of those attending religious schools by confusing educational motives with religious motives: only a small minority chose religious schools for religious reasons.

—Assuming that the existence of public and religious sectors provides families with a free choice and that this choice necessarily decreases social inequity within education and opens the doors of private schools to the lower classes. Langouët and Léger make clear that many families do not have any choice, first because of geographical inequalities—Catholic schools are more available in some regions; in other regions there are hardly any—but also because of social inequalities. Given the lower density of Catholic schools in France, they are simply too far away for many lower-class families to be a real option.

—Idealizing the positive effects of school autonomy and the competition between schools of public and religious sectors on the quality of teaching and the level of achievement. After controlling for the social background and initial scholastic ability of pupils entering different schools, the differences between Catholic and public schools were much smaller, although they were still significant and different for pupils from different social groups.

—Underestimating the differences in the scholastic success of pupils from different social classes in public and religious schools. Farmers’ children achieved better in public schools, while children of manual laborers and school employees achieved better in religious schools.

—Portraying the present public school as democratic and socially neutral and serving all children without making distinctions among them. If public schools are more democratic in their recruitment than religious schools, they are less democratic than religious schools in that they create larger differences in scholastic success among pupils from different social classes and they lead to the massive and early dropout of pupils from the working classes.

—Assuming that the relation between the public and religious schools is stable and unchangeable. The social composition of the two sectors changed between 1973–80 and 1980–87, in that the social class distribution of parents of pupils in religious schools became less different from the national distribution. The effects of both sectors likewise changed during that period: the religious sector continued to do much more to reduce social inequalities in scholastic success than the public sector. In addition, the strategies of the different social classes also changed: children of professionals and higher-level officials increased their participation in public education, while children from other classes increased their participation in religious schools.
Germany

Lutz Reuter provides an extensive overview of the complex school choice situation in Germany. One part of this complexity is a consequence of the broad freedom of the separate Länder (regions) in education within the federal framework. Another part is the distinction within the German nonpublic school sector of private independent schools (complementary schools) and the private dependent schools (substitute or alternative schools). Despite the large variety of public, private independent, and private dependent schools, there has been hardly any systematic comparison of the effectiveness of these school types in Germany. As Reuter remarks, the current system of public and private schooling seems to be accepted and there is no significant public pressure or even discourse about changing it. The same holds for the academic debate: in his overview of quality within the educational system, Fend, a distinguished scholar, does not discuss possible quality differences between public and private schools. Reuter expresses surprise that private schools were not able to reap the benefits of the public frustration over evidence of the below-average quality of German secondary schools. But there are only three studies on the effectiveness of public and private, government-dependent schools in Germany (both in the old and new Länder), and all were initiated by non-Germans. The private dependent schools analyzed in these three studies are either Catholic or Protestant schools, which receive a major part of their budget from their state.

Grammar Schools in Nordrhein-Westfalen

Dronkers and Hemsing analyzed the educational attainment of 3,240 grammar school pupils of the tenth grade in Nordrhein-Westfalen in 121 school classes at sixty-eight grammar schools (gymnasiums). They were interviewed for the first time in 1970 at the age of approximately sixteen years. All pupils were asked about their social background, their attitudes toward school, and their educational plans. In addition, intelligence tests were given, and the students’ parents, teachers, and principals also were interviewed. In 1985, 61 percent (1,989) of the former pupils—then approximately thirty years old—were interviewed again, and they were identified by the school that they attended. This interview provided information on the social background, the achievements, and future life plans of the students. Dronkers and Hemsing reported that pupils in Protestant and Catholic secondary schools in Nordrhein-Westfalen had higher educational outcomes than those in public schools, after controlling for other characteristics. This cannot be
explained by a greater selection of intelligent pupils in Protestant or Catholic schools or by their parents’ social class. Pupils in Catholic schools obtained higher grades at the end of grammar school, while pupils at Protestant schools attained higher educational levels in secondary education and were more successful in their further studies. Interestingly, pupils of nonreligious private schools do not have higher outcomes than pupils of public schools, after controlling for characteristics of parents and pupils. This difference can be explained by the distinction between a value community, which reinforces common religious and pedagogical values (private dependent schools) and a functional community, which may serve to maintain social class distinctions (private independent schools).

Dronkers and Hemsing also found that the success in university and occupational levels of pupils of Protestant and Catholic schools in Nordrhein-Westfalen were equal to those of pupils at public schools, after controlling for unequal educational outcomes and other characteristics. There was one exception: pupils of Catholic schools had lower-level occupations in their first jobs. A possible explanation is that Catholic grammar schools also function as seminaries for the training of priests, who attach less value to high status on their first job. Do pupils who attend religious schools become more religious as a consequence? Adults who were pupils in Catholic schools did attend church services more often than pupils from private or public schools. But that was not true for adults who were pupils in Protestant schools, which suggest there is no general religious school effect on later religiousness. A possible explanation for this is that there were more future priests among Catholic school students than future Protestant ministers among Protestant school students, and of course these future priests wind up attending church quite regularly.

Mathematics and Natural Sciences in Three Old Länder

Dronkers, Baumert, and Schwippert analyzed the Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS). The main survey was carried out in 1995–96 with a cross-section of students in grades 7 and 8 (mostly thirteen- and fourteen-year-olds). A representative sample of classes stratified according to state and school type was taken, covering 150 schools with one seventh and eighth grade each. TIMSS-Germany is designed longitudinally, with two measurement points at the end of the seventh and the eighth grades. Unlike the main international study, TIMSS-Germany also includes information on parents’ socioeconomic background and measures on basic dimensions of mental ability. The German TIMSS data contained five private government-dependent schools, scattered throughout three west German states:
Bayern, Niederrhein-Westfalen, and Rheinland-Pfalz. There were also nine public Realschule and thirteen public Gymnasiums (grammar schools) in the same states. The pupils were still at the beginning of their secondary school careers, so the possible effects of attending public and private dependent schools might have been underestimated. Dronkers, Baumert, and Schwippert rejected their hypothesis that pupils at religious secondary schools in Germany have higher learning results in mathematics and natural sciences than pupils from public schools. This was clearly not the case, whether one controls for parental characteristics, intelligence, or earlier performance in mathematics and natural sciences. But pupils in German public and private dependent schools differ clearly in their average intelligence levels. The higher intelligence level of private dependent school pupils cannot be explained by a stronger selection in these schools, because the parental backgrounds of pupils at public and private dependent schools do not differ significantly. The most likely explanation seems to be that private dependent schools offer a learning environment that stimulates the intelligence. Nevertheless the higher intelligence scores at private dependent schools do not lead to greater achievement in mathematics and natural sciences. A possible explanation of this contradiction is the difference in the “hidden curriculum” of public and of private dependent schools, explained in the following discussion.

Cognitive and Noncognitive Outcomes in Old and New Länder

Dronkers, Baumert, and Schwippert analyzed a database provided by a longitudinal study entitled Learning Processes, Educational Careers, and Psychosocial Development in Adolescence (BIJU). This study began with the investigation of the main cohort during the school year 1991–92. Data collection started with pupils in the seventh grade (the beginning of secondary school in Germany). The sample of school classes comprised some 8,000 students from 212 schools of all secondary school types in three states of west and east Germany (Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Niederrhein-Westfalen, and Sachsen-Anhalt). In order to separate the effects of school and grade, two classes per school were included in the sample. The authors used two waves of the BIJU data; pupils were tested in the seventh grade and retested in the tenth grade (halfway through secondary school). There were five private dependent schools (four Gymnasien, one Gesamtschule) in the first wave and four private dependent schools in the second wave (only Gymnasien) with enough valid data in the BIJU, scattered throughout the three German states. The authors included all public schools of the same type in the same state with enough valid data for the core variables. Because the pupils were only halfway through their secondary school careers (tenth grade), the possible
effects of attending public and private dependent schools might have been underestimated. Dronkers, Baumert, and Schwippert accepted their hypothesis that pupils of private dependent schools in Germany have higher cognitive and noncognitive scores on some tests than pupils from public schools, after controlling for other characteristics of schools and of parents. For the cognitive tests this was true only for English in the seventh grade and for biology in the tenth grade. But pupils attending private dependent schools did worse on mathematics in the tenth grade. For the noncognitive tests, seventh-grade students in private dependent schools also differed from pupils in public schools in their self-assessment of academic ability (lower) and willingness to help others (higher). Pupils of public and private dependent schools scored equally on the other cognitive and noncognitive tests.

A difference in the hidden curriculum of public and private dependent schools can explain the difference in effectiveness in natural sciences and mathematics and foreign languages. Within each German state, public and private dependent schools have the same curriculum and therefore do not officially deviate in what they offer their students. But on average teachers in private dependent schools might focus less on the highest results in mathematics and natural sciences and concentrate more on foreign languages, general knowledge, and noncognitive aspects of education (motivation, social competence, and so forth). That is precisely what was found in these analyses: pupils of private dependent schools did better on English tests but had the same results in mathematics and natural sciences; were more modest about their own academic ability but had a higher intelligence score; and claimed to help people because others, like their parents, expected them to help less often. A preference for foreign languages, general knowledge, and noncognitive aspects of education might be a result of the religious traditions in these private dependent schools (the majority being Catholic). But this preference might also reflect the wishes of parents who believe that these aspects of education are more important for upward social mobility or maintaining a high social position than the highest scores in mathematics and natural sciences. As long as private dependent schools are more successful in homogenizing (equalizing) the learning results in mathematics and natural sciences, parents might believe that less focus on these subjects by private dependent schools is not harmful for the life course of their children.44

The Netherlands

The Netherlands often is wrongly regarded as having a “unique” educational system with respect to parental choice of schools. Central to the Dutch
arrangement are the constitutional principle of freedom of education and the constitutional right of public and grant-aided private institutions to financial equality. But in other European countries (for example, Germany) religious schools also have a constitutional right to state financial support. More unique is the large size of the Dutch private school sector, although Belgium has a private school sector of nearly the same size.

A summary of the Dutch research on the differences in effectiveness of public and religious schools is provided by Dijkstra, Dronkers, and Karsten in chapter 3. I mention only some highlights here; there are too many studies of the differences between public and religious schools in the Netherlands, unlike other European countries, to present them in any detail. It is worth noting that in the Netherlands the major part of this research is done by university institutes without financial support from Dutch educational authorities, who deny differences in effectiveness because they politically unacceptable.

Dutch research contains significant evidence of the positive effects of Catholic and Protestant schooling on academic achievement. These differences, all adjusted for differences in the student intake of public and private schools, are reported in terms of drop-out rates, test scores, degrees, attainment, and so forth, both for primary and secondary schools. However, a number of apparent exceptions to the general religious school advantage complicate the picture.

The first deviation is that public schools in regions with a majority of Catholic or Protestant schools have greater effectiveness than public schools in regions with a majority of public schools. Second, schools that are both nonreligious and private have on average lower effectiveness than public schools, after controlling for the social composition and characteristics of the student body. Third, orthodox Protestant schools do not have greater effectiveness than public schools or less strict Protestant schools.

The fourth deviation is that the higher effectiveness of religious schools seems to be restricted to a certain historical period, the end of the 1960s to the 1990s. A possible explanation for this is the predominance of religious considerations in choosing a school before the 1960s and the disappearance of the small-scale advantages of religious schools during the 1990s due to the fact that individual Catholic and Protestant schools have become large schools directed by large-scale organizations supervising more and more schools.

Because of these four deviations and the denial by Dutch educational authorities of differences in the cognitive effectiveness of public and religious schools, the debate over the extent to which these differences are really
important and lasting is still unsettled. But most studies show differences in school effectiveness that vary with denomination, after taking into account the differences in pupil characteristics and school population. Insofar as these differences follow a regular pattern, the average effects are mainly negative for public schools and positive for private religious schools, with the nonreligious private school and the orthodox Protestant school being exceptions. It seems that Catholic schools in particular and to a lesser degree Protestant schools provide better learning environments. These results seem slightly more pronounced in primary education than in secondary education. Dutch private religious schools have a reputation for offering educational quality, which, as research shows, is an important factor in parents’ favoring religious schools in the Netherlands.

Most of the studies on school effectiveness are limited to the effects of sector on the cognitive domain of learning. Much less research has been undertaken to investigate possible differences between sectors in other domains—which is at least as interesting, particularly in the light of the "pillarized" history of the current Dutch school system, which links schools to distinct religious communities with distinct socialization processes and value systems. The picture of the noncognitive effects of religious schools is far less clear than that of their cognitive effects. Sometimes denomination-specific differences are reported, but mostly they are not, especially after controlling for the individual characteristics of pupils and their parents. On the whole one cannot find large differences among public and religious schools in the noncognitive domain, despite the special claims made on behalf of religious schools.

Dykstra, Dronkers, and Karsten point out in chapter 3 that the equal funding of private and public schools has promoted the diminution of prestigious elite schools outside the state-subsidized sector. Religious and public schools’ right to equal financing has prevented the skimming off of the most able students by either public or religious schools. Before the 1970s, the choice of a religious or public school was made not on educational but on religious grounds. As a result, the long experience with parental choice has not increased educational inequality in Dutch society. The differences between the effectiveness of religious and of public schools are quite recent, coming only after the pronounced secularization of Dutch society, and these differences could become the basis for new forms of inequality. Differences between parents in their knowledge of school effectiveness, which correlate with their own educational level, could certainly contribute to new inequalities. Free school choice provides possible means of ethnic and social segregation of schools, not necessarily only by catchment area and public or private
sector, but more often within the same catchment area and sector. The existence of free school choice thus can deepen the social and ethnic inequality among schools and thereby in society at large. But this possible deepening of social and ethnic segregation of schools in the Netherlands does not necessarily deepen the social and ethnic segregation between the public and religious school sectors, because public schools also benefit from—and are part of the system of—free school choice.

The United Kingdom

In chapter 4, Neville Harris shows that the position of religious state-funded schools in England and Wales is quite different from that of those in continental Europe and the other parts of the United Kingdom. Archer has tried to describe the causes (the struggle between church and modernizing state) and consequences of this difference (nation versus market orientation), quite convincingly. This is not the place even to summarize her argument, but it is important for the American reader to keep in mind the deep rift between the English and the other European educational systems. In 1939, about half of all schools in England were run by the Church of England and the Roman Catholic Church, although they provided for less than one-third of the total school population. Under the 1944 Education Act, all Roman Catholic schools and a minority of the Church of England schools opted for “aided” status, which offered greater autonomy in staff appointments and the content of religious education, combined with aid for all operating costs and some capital costs. The other Church of England schools opted for “controlled” status: they were entirely funded by the educational authorities with hardly any autonomy or freedom of staff appointment, but they maintained their own religious character. In addition to these Catholic and Anglican schools, other Protestant, Jewish, Muslim, and Sikh aided schools have more recently been established.

The main debate on school choice in England and Wales is not about these religious schools (aided or controlled) but on the devolution of decisionmaking power to schools at the expense of local education authorities. Harris’s chapter ably explores the struggles surrounding devolution. Perhaps because of this recent focus on devolution and earlier struggles over comprehensive secondary schools, it is hard to find empirical studies of the differences between public and religious schools in England and Wales.

Although useful information on the academic performance of all English schools is provided by the Office for Standards in Education (Ofsted), it does not help to determine whether religious schools do better or worse than non-
religious schools. The main problem is the unwillingness of the English educational inspectorate and the academic community to publish school performance indicators controlled for input differences in schools, as is done in France and the Netherlands. The only scientifically sound data on differences in cognitive effectiveness of public and religious schools that I found are those of Morris on cognitive performance in English Catholic secondary schools. His analyses suggest that students at those schools did better academically than comparable students in public schools. Those analyses are, however, descriptive rather than systematic.

The devolution of power to schools and the educational reforms of the 1990s have made “choice” schools of all publicly funded schools in England and Wales, as Stephen Gorard describes in chapter 5. One of the major debates is over whether this strong increase in the opportunity for school choice in England and Wales has increased the social segregation of schools. Gorard shows that there was hardly any important change in the level of segregation from 1989 to 2001. Student integration seemed to have improved during the mid 1990s, but by the start of the twenty-first century it returned to the level that existed before free school choice.

Conclusion

This review of systematic evidence concerning the differences in the effectiveness of public and of religious state-funded schools in seven different European societies highlights several important general points. First, differences in school success and cognitive outcomes clearly exist between public and religious schools in Belgium, France, Hungary, the Netherlands, and Scotland, and these differences cannot be explained by the different social composition of the student population or by other obvious social characteristics of pupils, parents, schools, or neighborhoods. These differences in effectiveness are less clear in Germany, although there are some indications of the higher effectiveness of German religious schools, especially if schools are analyzed within the context of a single Land (region). However, differences in noncognitive achievements, which often are the main argument for the existence of state-funded religious schools, are not found in Flemish Belgium, hardly at all in the Netherlands, and only partly in Germany. There also exist a number of indications in various societies (France, Germany, Hungary, and Netherlands) that children attending religious schools often do so for academic or social—not religious—reasons. The two last points contradict the raison d’être of state-funded religious schools, because the right of parents to determine the moral and religious education of their children always has been
more or less explicitly the basis of state recognition and funding of religious schools. But the higher cognitive effectiveness of state-funded religious schools also contradicts this raison d’être of religious schools, which maintain throughout that they do not want to compete with state schools for better academic outcomes. As a consequence, most state-funded religious schools and their organizations in various European societies tend to deny any higher cognitive effectiveness and try to avoid any research in that direction. Also state schools and their organizations tend to avoid research on their lower cognitive effectiveness in order to avoid embarrassment and political defeat by religious organizations, with which they have struggled so long for hegemony. This avoidance of political difficulties and embarrassment around a politically sensitive topic can explain why the research on effectiveness of public and state-funded private schools in Europe is not as extensive as one might expect given the disproportionate size of and the current increase in the state-funded school sector in various European countries.

Second, it appears that given the high level of state support for religious schools in these European societies and the relatively low school fees, differences in school effectiveness of religious and nonreligious public schools cannot be explained by large financial contributions from parents whose children attend religious schools. In various continental European countries the law forbids large financial contributions from parents as a condition for obtaining state grants. The spending levels are mostly equal across the public and the state-funded private school sectors, because that in most cases that is an essential element of the compromise between the state and the churches. If there exists a supplement for children with special needs, both sectors will profit from it in a more or less comparable way. If financial inequality does exist in these countries, in most cases schools in the state-funded private sector tend to be poorer.

Third, there is no evidence that more school choice in itself promotes the degree of social segregation of school sectors (the Netherlands) or even of same-sector schools (England). Neither is it true that public schools serve students from the lower classes best, while religious schools are more geared to serving the interests of the higher classes (for example, France, Germany, Netherlands, and Scotland). The results do not justify any easy correlation between social class and public or private schools. Free school choice can lower the degree of social segregation of neighborhoods, but at the same time increase the degree of social segregation of schools: the ultimate results of such contradictory movements are impossible to determine for certain.

This review allows only preliminary conclusions about the higher effectiveness of religious schools in European societies, but the direction of the
results is clear. Religious schools are generally more effective in the cognitive domain than public schools, while they no longer differ in the effectiveness of religious socialization because the majority of the religious schools no longer engage in religious socialization. This makes religious schools attractive for nonreligious parents who wish to maximize the educational outcomes of their children. The increase in the percentage of pupils attending religious schools in various European countries since the 1970s may illustrate their attractiveness. The importance of the differences in the cognitive domains indicates that educational systems with public and state-funded religious schools give parents a real choice among schools of different quality.

While systematic evidence is spotty at best, based on the evidence that is available, it does not seem to be the case that the much greater availability of publicly subsidized parental choice in Europe than in the United States has increased educational inequality or segregation or undermined either student learning or civic socialization. Public and religious schools in European societies exhibit higher levels of general achievement and smaller differences in average achievement among schools than those in the United States. In principle, therefore, European educational systems with public and religious subsidized school sectors are indeed a better place to test the basic assumption of the parental choice debate—that private and religious schools are more effective. However, because of the political sensitivity of the question of the effectiveness of public and state-funded religious schools, the evidentiary base for drawing conclusions is thin. Not enough is known about the effects of school choice in Europe, but what is known is generally comforting.

Notes

5. With perhaps the exception of Poland, these former communist societies have not become very religious since the fall of communism.
6. Also, for England we use the term public school in the usual international meaning of the word (schools organized and paid for by the local public authorities) instead of the misleading English meaning (selective private schools organized by educational entrepreneurs).
7. There is also some research on this topic in Spain, but these studies are not yet accessible.


10. About 12 percent of all pupils in secondary education attended Catholic, Calvinist, Lutheran, or Jewish gymnasiums in 1998.

11. Religious education is more widespread at the secondary level. Church-run schools represent only 5 percent of primary schools in Hungary; G. Halász and J. Lannert, eds., Jelentés a magyar közoktatásról 2000 (Budapest: OKI, 2000).


15. Social and political conflict between Catholic Irish and Protestant Scots is not unique to Scotland. The current troubles in Northern Ireland can be seen in part as a conflict been Protestant immigrants from Scotland and local Irish Catholics.

16. Also, the Protestant schools run by the Church of Scotland were taken over by the state in 1918. The Church of Scotland still has the right to be represented on the education committee of every regional authority.

17. McPherson and Willms, “Certification, Class Conflict, Religion, and Community.”

18. For the description of the Belgian system, I draw on C. L. Glenn, Choice of Schools in Six Nations (U.S. Department of Education, 1989); and M. Elchardus and D. Kavadias, The Socializing Effects of Educational Networks: The Relevance of the Distinction between Public and Private Schools with Relation to Noncognitive Outcomes of Last Year Pupils in Flanders (Belgium) (Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Department of Sociology, 2000).

19. A negligible minority of these “free” schools are Protestant, Jewish or based on a specific educational method.

20. One explanation for the absence of research on cognitive achievements of pupils in public and Catholic schools might be the absence of a national final exami-
nation at the end of secondary school in Belgium, in contrast to France, the Netherlands, and some German Länder.


24. Students also were asked to rank themselves academically vis-à-vis their peers, and the answers to this question closely correlated with the self-reported grade point averages.

25. Such students tend to have lower socioeconomic status, mothers who are more often unemployed, less parental involvement in children’s education, and more family disruption.


27. Turks and Moroccans are the largest groups of non-European immigrant workers who have come to Europe since the 1960s.


29. An adapted form of the index used in the European Values Study.


31. A possible reason is the political nature of any debate on the effectiveness of public and private education in France, and the tendency of social scientists to shy away from politically incorrect topics.


33. Ibid., pp. 140–44.

34. This regional difference in availability of Catholic schools has deep historical roots, dating back to the sixteenth-century religious wars and the French Revolution in the late eighteenth century.

35. See chapter 8 in this volume.


37. Publications of the Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) and Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA).

38. J. Dronkers and W. Hemsing, “Effektivität öffentlichen, kirchlichen, und privaten Gymnasialunterrichts. Bildungs-, Berufs- und Sozialisationseffekte in nor-
Do Public and Religious Schools Really Differ?

311


39. Amthauer’s intelligence test.


41. For further information on the German TIMSS data and measurement of mental ability, see J. Baumert and others, TIMSS Mathematisch-naturwissenschaftlicher Unterricht im internationalen Vergleich. Deskriptive Befunde (Opladen: Leske and Budrich, 1997).


43. For further information, see K. Schnabel, Prüfungangst und Lernen (Berlin: Waxmann, 1998), and O. Köller, Zielorientierungen und schulishes Lernen (Berlin: Waxmann, 1998).

44. An indication of the greater potential of private independent schools to homogenize learning outcomes in mathematics and natural sciences is their smaller standard deviations on these outcome tests.

45. It is still to early to draw conclusions on the cognitive effectiveness of Dutch Islamic schools, but it already is clear that they do not deviate negatively from non-Islamic schools with comparable characteristics.

46 “Pillarized” refers to the segmentation of Dutch society in separate networks of organizations and institutions (unions, hospitals, journals, schools, clubs, libraries, and so forth) on the basis of religion and ideology (Catholic, Protestant, social democrat, neutral).


49. These preliminary conclusions also underline the necessity of a systematic and sophisticated Europe-wide study of differences in the effectiveness of public and religious schools, such as that recently carried out in J. Dronkers and P. Robert, “The Effectiveness of Public and Private Schools from a Comparative Perspective,” EUI Working Paper SPS 2003/13 (European University Institute, 2003).

51. A first example of such a more sophisticated and systematic comparison of effectiveness in reading and mathematics in public schools, private dependent schools, and private independent schools in eighteen OECD countries is the analysis of the OECD’s PISA data in Dronkers and Robert, “The Effectiveness of Public and Private Schools from a Comparative Perspective.” But again, this analysis has been carried out by two independent academics.